We evaluate the impact of vocational rehabilitation services on employment outcomes of adults with physical disabilities. Using detailed panel data from the Virginia Department of Rehabilitation Services (DARS) in State Fiscal Year 2000, we estimate a structural model of participation that accounts for the potentially sudden onset of physical impairments and the endogenous selection of VR services. The results imply that VR services have large positive long-run labor market e¤ects that substantially exceed the cost of providing services.
Introduction
Fifteen percent of working-age adults have a physical disability that limits the kind or amount of work they can undertake (NHIS, 2012) . In addition to direct medical costs, physical impairments have substantial economic costs. Musculoskeletal disabilities, for example, are estimated to have indirect costs associated with reduced productivity and earnings of nearly $130 billion (2015) per year (Yelin and Callahan, 1995; Ma, Chan, and Carruthers, 2014).
To insure against the risk of sudden disabling injury, many government assistance programs provide …nancial assistance to persons with physical impairments, including the workers compensation and federal disability insurance programs. Vocational rehabilitation programs, however, serve a di¤erent and
We would like to thank Joe Ashley, John Phelps, Kirsten Rowe, Ann Stan…eld, Vlad Mednikov, and Jim Rothrock from Virginia Department of Aging and Rehabilition Services (DARS), David Stapleton, and other members of the National Institute of Disability and Rehabilitation Research (NIDRR) Advisory Group for excellent help and advice and Rachel Fowley for excellent research assistance. The DRS, the Virginia Department of Medical Assistive Services, the NIDRR, and the University of Virginia Bankard Fund for Political Economy provided generous …nancial support. All errors are ours. important role. Rather than providing insurance, VR programs aim to improve labor market outcomes. Established in 1919 to deliver restorative services to persons with physical disabilities, today the public-sector Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program is a $3 billion federal-state partnership designed to provide employment-related assistance to persons with disabilities. These state-run programs assess the client's ability to return to work, develop a plan to assist the client, and provide a wide range of services (e.g., training and rehabilitation). While thought to play an important role in helping persons with physical disabilities to engage in gainful employment (Loprest, 2007) , very little is known about the long term-e¢ cacy of VR in the United States.
We …ll this void by evaluating the impact of VR services on labor market outcomes of adults with physical disabilities in Virginia. This work complements our previous evaluations of the impact of VR on persons with mental illness and cognitive disabilities (Dean et al., 2015 (Dean et al., , 2016 . Applying and extending the approach developed in Dean et al. (2015 Dean et al. ( , 2016 , we use detailed panel data on all persons who applied for VR services from the Virginia Department of Aging and Rehabilitation Services (DARS) in State Fiscal Year 2000. With quarterly employment and earnings data from 1995 to 2008, we observe labor market outcomes prior to, during, and after service receipt.
As in Dean et al. (2015; 2016) , we aggregate VR services into six types -diagnosis and evaluation, training, education, restoration, maintenance, and other services -and allow these six services to have di¤erent labor market e¤ects. To do this, we estimate a multivariate discrete choice model of service provision and labor market outcomes. To address the associated selection problem, we use instrumental variables that are assumed to impact service receipt but not the latent labor market outcomes, pre-program labor market outcomes that control for di¤erences between those who will and will not receive services, and a formal structural model of the selection process. Importantly, we modify the Dean et. al. (2015 Dean et. al. ( , 2016 model to account for the latent process determining the onset of physical disabilities. In this analysis, it is particularly important to model the onset of physical impairments where a large fraction of clients may have had unexpected and sudden injuries.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model used throughout the paper. We construct a multivariate discrete choice model for service provision choices. We augment that with a probit-like employment equation and an earnings equation. We allow for correlation of errors among all of the equations. Next, we describe the three sources of data used in our analysis in Section 3 and the econometric methodology used to estimate the model in Section 4. Estimation results are presented in Section 5, and a rate-of-return analysis is presented in Section 6. Our results imply high rates of return but with signi…cant variation in returns across people with varying characteristics.
Model
Following Dean et al. (2015 Dean et al. ( , 2016 , let y ij be the value for individual i of participating in VR service j, j = 1; 2; ::; J, and y ij = 1 y ij > 0 be an indicator for whether i receives service j. 1 Assume that
w it = X 
where variables are de…ned analogously to equation (2) . The time periods implied by the nodes we use are a) 2 or more quarters before service, b) 1 quarter before service, c) 1 quarter after service to 8 quarters after service, and d) 9 or more quarters after service. Given our rich labor market data, we are able to estimate both short-run (the …rst eight quarters) and long-run (more than two years) e¤ects of services and account for preservice outcomes. Inclusion of pre-treatment periods is a way to account for the endogenous selection into services. The quarter immediately prior to initial service provision is separated out because this quarter seems likely to have a distinct impact on selection and because of the well-documented variation in labor market behaviors just prior to the application period -the Ashenfelter dip (Ashenfelter, 1978; Heckman et al., 1999) .
Importantly, the physical disability vector, d it , is unobserved for periods prior to DARS service. For people with disabilities such as mental illness (Dean et al., 2016) or cognitive impairments (Dean et al., 2015) , it is reasonable to assume that the disability was in place at the beginning of the sample. For people with physical disabilities, such an assumption is not reasonable. Instead, we model the physical disability transition process. De…ne the unobserved date of the start of the physical disability as and assume that
and d it is unobserved if 0 t < 2 where 0 is the …rst quarter of data and 2 is the …rst quarter of DARS service receipt. 2 Let
and assume that
We model the probability that i is disabled at t as
where p 0 is a parameter and log e p t , t = 0 +1; 0 +2; ::; 2 is modelled as a spline in slopes. 4 This speci…cation insures that disability occurs some time between 0 and 2 inclusive; it is equivalent to modelling a more general speci…cation and then conditioning on the event that the physical disability occurs. The parameters, p 0 and the spline slopes, are identi…ed by the distribution of timing going backward from the beginning of DARS service receipt to a negative break in pre-service labor market outcomes.
Finally, assume that . We also allow for serial correlation and contemporaneous correlation in the labor market errors (
2 While the onset of a physical disability may occur prior to the …rst quarter observed in the data, 0 , the model allows for ‡exible transitions within the sample period across individuals i. 3 The covariates we observe, X i ; do not vary over time. Thus, we do not condition the analysis on observed covariates, X i . We can identify the e¤ect of X i on p 0 but choose instead to treat it as a constant. 4 Nodes are at 2 , 2 4, and 2 8. For identi…cation, e p 2 is restricted to be one.
The covariance matrix implied by this error structure is presented in Appendix 8.1.
Data
The primary data used in this analysis come from the administrative records of the Virginia DARS for individuals who applied for vocational rehabilitation (VR) services in SFY 2000 (July 1, 1999 -June 30, 2000). Our sample includes the 2421 DARS clients with physical impairments, and we focus on VR services received in the "base case"de…ned as an individual's initial case in SFY 2000.
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These data are merged with the quarterly earnings records of the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) from 1995 to 2008 and with data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis on county-speci…c employment patterns. In this section, we …rst describe the administrative data from DARS and then provide details on the VEC data.
DARS Data

Services
Upon application, an individual's case is assigned to a counselor who assesses the individual's eligibility for the program. This assessment typically includes a diagnosis of the impairment. The case may be administratively closed at this point because the impairment is deemed insu¢ ciently severe or too severe or because the individual withdraws from further consideration for VR eligibility. Beyond assessment and some counseling, these individuals receive few, if any, purchased services.
In contrast, for all other clients, the counselor and individual develop an individualized plan for employment (IPE) which speci…es the array of services to be provided. Services can include, for example, restorative medical care, training, and education. For each case, we observe dates, quantities, costs, and types of purchased service for the 76 separate services provided by DARS. 6 Following Dean et al. (2002) , we aggregate these services into the six service types listed in Table 2 . As discussed above, diagnosis & evaluation 7 are provided at intake in assessing eligibility and developing an IPE and possibly later in the form of job counseling and placement services. Training includes vocationally-oriented 5 Excluded from the sample are 112 observations where primary and/or secondary diagnosis is missing and 117 individuals with neither any service records nor employment records. We also drop 929 observations where the individual's …rst service spell was prior to SFY 2000. We do this to avoid bias associated with left censoring (e.g., Heckman and Singer, 1984) . Dean et al. (2015) shows that the bias caused by left-censoring is large for people with cognitive impairments. 6 We do not observe services provided either in-house or by another government agency. Dean et. al. (2016) …nd that between 6 and 15 percent of clients receive non-purchased services and that the e¤ect of non-purchased services on labor market outcomes is 43.2% of that for purchased services. 7 Variable names are displayed in a di¤erent font to avoid confusion. expenditures including those for on-the-job training, job coach training, work adjustment, and supported employment. Education includes tuition and fees for a GED (graduate equivalency degree) program, a vocational or business school, a community college, or a university. Restoration, which is designed to reduce the impact of one's disability, covers a wide variety of medical expenditures including dental services, hearing/speech services, eyeglasses and contact lenses, drug and alcohol treatments, psychological services, surgical procedures, hospitalization, prosthetic devices, and other assistive devices. Maintenance includes cash payments to facilitate everyday living and covers such items as transportation, clothing, motor vehicle and/or home modi…cations, and services to family members. Other services consist of payments outside of the previous categories such as for tools and equipment. Diagnostic and evaluation services are purchased in 56:5% of the base cases and restoration in 38:7%. Purchased services are provided in less than a third of the cases for every other service type. This should be quali…ed by noting that 17% of applicants are not accepted into the program, and another 21% drop out after acceptance but before receiving substantive services. Of the remaining applicants, 80% are provided a purchased service other than for diagnosis & evaluation.
As is seen in Table 3 , a high proportion of clients receive multiple purchased services during the same service spell. For example, while the most common service combination in the initial service spell is diagnosis & evaluation with no other service (d), the second most common is diagnosis & evaluation along with restoration (dr), the third most common is restoration by itself (r), and the fourth most common is diagnosis & evaluation along with restoration and other services (dro). Given the frequency with which clients receive multiple services, it is critical for us to allow for the possibility of receipt of multiple services. Thus, the structure of the service choice in equation (1) Table 4 displays sample moments for the explanatory variables used in this analysis. In addition to standard measures of race, gender, age, access to transportation, marital status, and family size, there are many variables indicating the type and severity of the applicants limitation. We use eight dummy variables, each equal to one i¤ the individual's primary or secondary disability at intake in the base SFY 2000 case was diagnosed as a musculoskeletal impairment, an internal disability, a cognitive impairment, a mental illness, a substance abuse problem, an "other disability,"a speci…c disability that is musculo/skeletal in nature (musculo/skeletal disability subgroup), and a speci…c disability that is internal in nature (internal disability subgroup). 8 An individual's counselor also assesses the signi…cance of the disability. Three levels are identi…ed: not signi…cant (used as the base level), signi…cant (0.606), and most signi…cant (0.161). Special education is a dummy variable equal to 1 for those observations where the respondent received some type of special education and a special education certi…cate; 1:4% of the respondents received such education. Education information is missing for 15:4% of the sample. Rather than exclude such observations, we included a dummy variable for when education information was missing.
Covariates
As are correlated with the treatment assignment but not included in the labor market equations (2) and (3). These instruments are the proportion of other clients in our cohort for the individual's counselor receiving a particular service and the proportion of other clients in our cohort for the individual's …eld o¢ ce receiving a particular service. These variables are transformed as is described in Appendix 8.2. The properties of these instruments depend upon the distribution of client size in our sample across counselors and …eld o¢ ces and the distribution of the proportion of clients receiving each service. Figures 1 and 2 provide some information about these distributions. Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of proportion of clients for each …eld o¢ ce receiving each service. For example, for diagnosis & evaluation, 10:4% provide the service to 16:7% of their clients or less, and 10:4% provide it for at least 89:6% of their clients. Figure 1 shows that diagnosis & evaluation is the most commonly provided service, followed by restoration, then other services with training, maintenance, and education following. Figure 2 has similar properties for counselors. There is strong evidence of signi…cant variation in behavior across counselors and across …eld o¢ ces. We reject the null hypothesis that the joint density of services within o¢ ces does not vary across o¢ ces using a likelihood ratio test. The test statistic is 937:01 (with 240 df and normalized value of 31:81). We also can test the null hypothesis that each o¢ ce provides each service in the same proportion, one at a time, using a likelihood ratio test. The test statistic is 1105:44 (with 288 df and a normalized value of 34:06). For counselors, the analogous test statistics are 1603:96 (with 785 df and a normalized value of 20:67) and 3975:73 (with 942 df and a normalized value of 69:89). The fact that there is signi…cant variation in the provision of services across o¢ ces and counselors makes these instruments viable.
Finally, we supplement the DARS data with local labor market data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The DARS data contain geographic identi…ers so that we can match each DARS client with her county of residence. The BEA provides information on population size and number of people employed, disaggregated by age and county (BEA, 2010a). We construct measures of log employment rates by county (see Dean et. al., 2016) . 
VEC Data
A unique features of these data is that we observe individual quarterly earnings prior to, during, and after service receipt from the employment records provided to the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) during the 47-quarter period spanning July 1995 through March 2009. Recall that equations (2) and (3) model employment and earnings impacts in four separate periods o¤set from the date of …rst service. Because the date of …rst service can fall anywhere within a quarter, that quarter is excluded from the analysis other than for use as a period of demarcation separating pre-service from post-service periods. Thus, depending upon the date of …rst service, we observe 16 to 19 quarters of preservice earnings periods and 28 to 31 quarters post-service quarters.
In our analysis, we try to explain two labor market outcome variables: employment and log quarterly earnings. Employment, a binary measure of working in a particular quarter in the labor market, is modeled in equation (2) and log quarterly earnings conditional on employment is modeled in equation (3). Table 5 provides information on sample sizes and on the moments of employment and earnings data disaggregated between quarters before and after initial service provision. One can see that employment rates decline after service provision and quarterly earnings increase (conditional on working).
Figures 3 and 4 display quarterly employment rates and earnings (conditional on employment), respectively, for SFY 2000 applicants who receive substantial VR services and those that do not receive substantial services. We refer to these two groups as the treated and untreated, respectively. In these …gures, quarters are measured relative to application date (not the initial service date) so that quarter 0 is the quarter of application, quarter 4 is one year prior to application, and quarter 4 is one year post-application.
Perhaps the most striking …nding is seen in Figure 3 which shows that, prior to the application quarter, the employment rates of the treated and untreated are nearly identical, with a sharp drop in employment (and earnings) that begins about 4 quarters prior to the application. For example, the employment rates drop from around 0:52 one year prior to the application to 0:42 for the untreated and 0:47 for the treated in the application quarter. Just after the application quarter, the employment rates for untreated continue to fall at a much more pronounced rate than for the treated. One year after the application quarter, While there is a notable association between DARS service receipt and employment, no such relationship exists with conditional earnings. Figure 4 shows that quarterly earnings among the employed are almost identical for the treated and the untreated throughout.
Thus, the data suggest that VR treatment services are associated with a sharp, substantial, and sustained increase in employment but no discernible change in quarterly earnings among the employed. However, as is shown in Section 5, these aggregate facts do not describe the full story of how VR services impact labor market outcomes.
Econometric Methodology
Likelihood Function
The parameters of the model are = ( y ; z ; w ; e p) where ; and e p are the physical disability transition parameters de…ned in equation (4) . We estimate the parameters of the model using maximum simulated likelihood (MSL). The likelihood contribution for observation i is
where
is the joint density of the start of the physical disability introduced in equation (4),
and G (u i j ) is the joint normal density with covariance matrix described in equation (13) . While, in general, it is di¢ cult to evaluate the multivariate integral in equation (6), it is straightforward to simulate the integral using well-known methods described in Stern (1997) . The functional form of the conditional likelihood contribution associated with observed program choices, L y i (u y i ) in equation (7), follows from the assumption in equation (1) (8), (9) , and (10), follow from the normality assumption for ( z it ; w it ) and the bivariate normality assumption for (
In theory, the parameter estimates are consistent only as the number of independent draws used to simulate the likelihood contributions goes o¤ to in…nity. However, Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1992) shows that MSL estimates perform well for small and moderate numbers of draws as long as good simulation methods are used, 10 and Geweke (1988) shows that the simulation error occurring in simulation-based estimators is of order (1=n) when antithetic acceleration is used.
Identi…cation
Service receipt and labor market outcome variables are likely to be endogenous. Much of the literature relies on limited controls for pre-program earnings and assumes service participation is otherwise exogenous. Along with Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and Dean et al. (2015 Dean et al. ( , 2016 , this is one of the …rst studies to identify the impact of VR services on labor market outcomes using both a history of pre-program earnings and plausibly exogenous instrumental variables. In particular, following Dean et. al. (2015 Dean et. al. ( , 2016 , two approaches are used address this identi…cation problem. First, as in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence design, we control for pre-treatment labor market di¤erences between those who do and do not receive services. If the di¤erences in unobserved factors that confound inference in equations (2) and (3), u it , do not vary over time, then controls for the observed pre-treatment labor market di¤erences address the endogenous selection problem (see Meyer, 1995 ; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999, Section 4). Second, we include two instruments in equation (1) that are excluded from equations (2) and (3). As described in Section 3.1.2 and Appendix 8.2, our choice of instruments for service j is the propensity of an individual's counselor to assign other clients to service j and the propensity of an individual's …eld o¢ ce to assign other clients to service j. Doyle (2007), Arrighi et al. (2010) , and Dean et al. (2015 Dean et al. ( , 2016 ) use a similar instrument. In order for the instruments to be valid, it must be the case that they are correlated with service receipt, they can be excluded from equations (2) and (3), and they are exogenous. These instruments are associated with service receipt (see Section 3.1.2) and do not seem to belong in the labor market equations. Moreover, given controls for the disabilities of the clients and the local labor market conditions, it seems reasonable to assume that the instruments are not related to the labor market structural errors. In particular, clients with similar disabilities are randomly assigned to counselors (Dean et al., 2016) and idiosyncratic features of the local labor market that may in ‡uence counselor/…eld o¢ ce service provision choices are accounted for using the county employment rates from the BEA.
Estimation Results
Services and Labor Market Outcomes
We …rst examine the estimated e¤ect of services on labor market outcomes. Table 7 presents the estimates and associated standard errors for the e¤ect of services on employment, and Table 8 presents the analogous results for conditional log quarterly earnings. For each labor market outcome, the e¤ects are allowed to vary across the six di¤erent service types and across di¤erent time periods relative to the initial service quarter. Given our rich labor market data, we are able to estimate both short-run (the …rst two years) and long-run (more than two years) e¤ects of services and account for pre-service outcomes in the quarter prior to services as well as two or more quarters prior to the initial service. As noted in Section 4.2, inclusion of pre-treatment periods is a way to account for the e¤ect of endogenous selection into services.
The …rst two columns of Tables 7 and 8 , which display estimates for the quarters prior to the initial service, provide evidence that selection is endogenous. Nine out of twelve of the coe¢ cients associated with periods two or more quarters prior to the initial service are substantial and statistically di¤erent than zero. The estimates suggest that those people with physical disabilities provided maintenance have higher pre-treatment employment probabilities. For diagnosis & evaluation, education, and other services, the estimates imply selection is negatively associated with pre-service employment probabilities. Receipt of all services are negatively associated with pre-service log quarterly earnings.
The last two columns of results in both tables display the estimated shortand long-run e¤ects of services on labor market outcomes. These estimates should be interpreted relative to the coe¢ cients associated with pre-service mea- 2.Single-starred items are statistically significant at the 10% level, and doublestarred items are statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 7 , prior to service provision, the e¤ect of training on employment propensity is 0:008. 11 In the two years after the start of service provision, it rises to 0:316, and then, in the longer run, it rises to 0:400. The long-term e¤ect of training on those who were trained after accounting for selection into service, is 0:400 + :008 = 0:408.
The e¤ects of each service type across the four time periods can be observed more easily in Figure 5 . Relative to employment propensities two or more quarters prior to service provision, we observe that all services except maintenance increase employment propensity in both the short and long run. With the exceptions of maintenance, all of the e¤ects are statistically signi…cant at the 5% signi…cant level. Table 8 displays estimates for the e¤ect of purchased service provision on conditional log quarterly earnings. As was true for employment propensity above, we allow for separate e¤ects for each service type and for the same four periods. The relative e¤ects can be observed more easily in Figure 6 . For earnings e¤ects, with the exception of maintenance, service receipt leads to higher earnings conditional on employment. All of the e¤ects are statistically signi…cant at the 5% signi…cant level.
Most previous evaluations of VR services focus on the impact of a single treatment indicator that is assumed to be conditionally exogenous. In this setting, the basic idea is to compare the di¤erences in mean outcomes between treatment and control groups after conditioning on observed variables. For example, Figures 3 and 4 above, which display the unconditional mean employment and earnings outcomes respectively, suggest little pre-program di¤erences, The structural model estimated in this paper extends this approach in several important ways: …rst, by conditioning on observed covariates; second, by accounting for six di¤erent types of service rather than a single treatment indicator; and …nally, by using instrumental variables in a model with endogenous service provisions. The results from the structural model estimates presented in this section suggest a much more complex and nuanced story with evidence of pre-and post-program labor market di¤erences that vary across services and estimated employment and earnings e¤ects that are varied but positive for all services except maintenance.
Interestingly, the estimated e¤ects of services on labor market outcomes for people with physical disabilities are quite di¤erent than for those with mental illness (Dean et al., 2016) or those with cognitive impairments (Dean et al., 2015) . Consider, for example, restoration services which are used nearly two times as much for persons with physical impairments than those with cognitive impairments. The estimated long-run e¤ects of restoration on employment are negative for clients with mental illness and cognitive impairments but large and positive for persons with physical impairments.
Because of the variation in e¤ects over time and over labor market outcomes as seen in Figures 5 and 6 , it is di¢ cult to infer the long-run bene…ts of each service. Figure 7 reports the median and a 95% con…dence range for the present value for 10 years of earnings ‡ows 12 (measured in $1000) excluding service costs. Except for maintenance, all of the services have large, positive long-run bene…ts. Education and restoration have median bene…ts of $52030 and $55591 respectively, while diagnosis & evaluation, other services and training have me- Figure 7 is the high degree of variability across the caseload. The discounted bene…ts associated with restoration, for example, range from $5920 to $250927, and education has a similar spread. This large range occurs because of variation in other observable characteristics. 13 In general, these estimated long run bene…ts are much larger than those found when evaluating the impact of VR on clients with mental illness or cognitive impairments. For people with mental illness, Dean et al. (2016) …nd that, on average, training, restoration, and other services have bene…ts on the order of $7200, $3750, and $4800 respectively, while education and maintenance have positive bene…ts of $1700 and $2100 respectively. For people with cognitive impairments (Dean et al., 2015) , median long-run discounted bene…ts are around $10000 for training and other services, and $36000 for education.
Covariates
The model allows for the full set of observed demographic characteristics to a¤ect the propensity to use di¤erent services (y ijt in equation (1)) and the two labor market outcomes of interest (z it in equation (2) and w it in equation (3)) . For the most part, these observed characteristics do not have statistically signi…cant e¤ects on service receipt 14 but do have statistically signi…cant e¤ects on the labor market outcomes (see Appendix 8.3) . As expected, we …nd positive estimated e¤ects of male on conditional log quarterly earnings (0:191), of education on employment propensity (0:038) and log quarterly earnings (0:057), and of white on employment propensity (0:036) and log quarterly earnings (0:165). The two transportation variables also have positive impacts on both labor market outcomes. The local employment rate increases both employment propensity (0:145) and log quarterly earnings (0:113). Also, the extent of disability variables decrease both employment propensity ( 0:311, 0:775) and log quarterly earnings ( 0:123, 0:421). The estimated e¤ect of being married on employment propensity ( 0:235) and log quarterly earnings ( 0:075) might seem counterintuitive, but it can be interpreted to mean that, when a spouse exists, there is less pressure on the disabled individual to work or to work many hours. The positive e¤ects for special education may be due to the higher propensity for such people to use long-term employment support services (LTESS). 15 Table 10 presents estimates of counselor and o¢ ce e¤ects as de…ned in Appendix 8.2. There are two types of coe¢ cient estimates reported in the table: a) the counselor and o¢ ce e¤ects and b) the missing counselor e¤ects. The counselor and o¢ ce e¤ects should be interpreted as @Ey ij =@e i where y ij is the latent variable associated with receipt of service j in equation (1) and e i is the counselor or o¢ ce e¤ect de…ned in Appendix 8.2; note that these are restricted to be the same across di¤erent services. The missing counselor e¤ects are the e¤ect on y ij when the relevant counselor does not have enough other clients to compute a set of counselor e¤ects. 16 These counselor and o¢ ce instrumental variables turn out to have large and statistically signi…cant e¤ects on service provision across clients. One should note that, in Table 10 , we are controlling for a full set of demographic characteristics, so it is unlikely that these results re ‡ect variation in the mix of clients across counselors and/or …eld o¢ ces.
Disability Transition Parameters
In equation (4), we model the transition rate from non-disabled to physically disabled. Table 11 presents the estimates associated with this transition process and the e¤ects of disability on the labor market outcomes. The direct e¤ect of disability is large for both employment propensity ( 2:659) and log quarterly earnings ( 0:877). estimates imply that the probability of an individual being disabled 15 quarters prior to DARS application is 0:627, and the remaining 37:3% transition during the sample frame. The transition probability in each quarter after the initial period varies from 6:2% in the second period (15 quarters prior to application) to 0:5% in the period prior to DARS application.
Error Covariance Parameters
Our model has a rich error covariance structure, as seen in equation (5). This allows for the possibility that unobservables associated with service provision are correlated with unobservables associated with labor market outcomes. The factor loadings for Factor 1 in Table 12 demonstrate positive correlations between the errors associated the labor market outcomes and negative correlations with the provision of diagnosis & evaluation, training, restoration, and maintenance. This suggests that there is some unobserved personal characteristic, maybe some component of ability, that increases employment probabilities and conditional earnings decreases service provision probabilities. 2. The element inf Factor 2 for other services is restricted to insure that the two factors are orthogonal with respect to the six factor loadings associated with the services available.
Factor 2 Factor 1 1. Single-starred items are statistically significant at the 10% level, and double-starred items are statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the factor loadings for Factor 2 imply small, statistically insignificant correlations between errors associated with service provision and the errors associated with labor market outcomes but positive and signi…cant correlations between the errors associated with employment propensity and log quarterly earnings. This suggests another unobserved characteristic, perhaps another dimension of ability, increasing employment propensity and log quarterly earnings but having no real impact on service receipt.
The remaining estimates are for variance and correlation terms. The estimate of the standard deviation of the log earnings error is 1:045, implying that a standard deviation in quarterly earnings due to unobserved factors is on the order of $6098. 18 It is unclear how much of this variation is due to variation in wages and how much is due to variation in hours. Baldwin (2005) …nds wage e¤ects on the order of 0:2 (see McKeithen and Stern, 2007 , for calculations) but does not estimate hours e¤ects. The estimate for = 0, implying no statistically important serial correlation in employment propensity and log quarterly earnings errors.
Speci…cation Tests
We use standard goodness-of-…t tests to measure how well we are predicting service provision probabilities. For each service, we decompose the sample into 40 cells, each of length 0:025, strati…ed by the predicted probability of service receipt. 19 Then we construct the standard 2 test statistic. The results are reported in Table 13 . For each service except for restoration and maintenance, we accept the null that the model predictions equal observed probabilities at the 5% percent signi…cance level. Figure 9 plots the predicted and sample probabilities for receipt of restoration. Deviations between the 45 line and the sample line at any particular predicted probability represents that part of restoration receipt probability that we are not predicting. Even though we reject the null hypothesis in Table 13 for restoration, in Figure 9 , we observe that we are generally …tting restoration receipt probabilities. For maintenance, in Figure 10 , we see that some of the deviations are larger, especially in the higher ranges. 20 We perform the same test for employment probabilities disaggregated into probabilities before and after service receipt. 21 The test statistics are Setting = 7:828 (from Table 5 ) provides the result. 1 9 For each test, some cells are empty and therefore not used. 2 0 The smoothed sample probabilities are constructed as: Figure 11 plots the deviations between predicted and sample employment probabilities for the two periods. Deviations between the 45 line and the other two sample lines at any particular predicted probability represent that part of employment probability that we are not predicting well. The model does a pretty good job predicting employment probabilities in the after period except around a predicted probability of about 0:6. The before period predictions are poor, especially around a predicted probability of 0:06 and after around a predicted probability of about 0:5. The poor performance near 0:15 is caused a small sample size of 13 observations. We consider a number of Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests to test for missing pieces of our model -the interaction of demographic characteristics, the interaction of service type in the employment outcome equations, and the duration of service provision by type. In each case, we report two types of statistics. Let log L i ( ; ) be the log likelihood contribution from equation (6) where is the vector of parameters de…ned above equation (6) and is the vector of parameters associated with a particular hypothesis test; i.e., H 0 : = 0 vs H A : 6 = 0 which, in the context of the LM test, becomes
where D 1 [ ] is the inverse covariance matrix of its argument and k is the number of elements in . However, for many of the hypotheses considered, D
1 [ ] is not well-behaved because the score statistics are too colinear. Thus, we also report t-statistics,
for each individual element of . 22 First, we consider allowing for interactions among pairs of services in the labor market outcome equations. In fact, none of the individual t-tests are statistically signi…cant, but 2 30 = 57:9 is statistically signi…cant. We also consider two more parsimonious speci…cations for interactions. First, for each labor market outcome, we consider the addition of a dummy variable that is equal to one i¤ the individual uses at least two services. Neither of the labor market e¤ects are statistically signi…cant, and 2 2 = 4:84 is not statistically signi…cant. Second, we distinguish between diagnosis & evaluation versus the other …ve services. In particular, for each labor market outcome, we include both the dummy in the …rst case, and we add a second dummy equal to one i¤ the individual uses at least two services excluding diagnosis & evaluation. Again, none of the individual t-statistics are statistically signi…cant, but the overall 2 4 = 13:76 is statistically signi…cant. Overall, these results suggest that, to the degree that service interactions are important, it is only through their interaction with other explanatory variables.
Finally, we consider the addition of interactions between gender and race on labor market outcomes. The results of these tests are reported in Table  14 . 23 The results suggest that, in the short run, white females (0:116 + 0:046 = 0:162) and black (0:345 + 0:209 = 0:554) and white (0:177 + 0:154 = 0:331) males have stastistically signi…cantly higher employment propensities and log quarterly earnings, and, in the long run, white females (0:052 + 0:069 = 0:121) and black (0:155 + 0:211 = 0:366) and white (0:149 + 0:144 = 0:293) males have statistically signi…cantly higher log quarterly earnings. We also allowed for interactions between gender, race, and service type. However, with only one exception, none of the score statistics associated with interactions of all three were statistically signi…cant.
Distribution of Rate of Return
In this section, we compare the estimated bene…ts and costs of the program, and estimate the rate of return to VR services (see Dean et al., 2015 Dean et al., , 2016 . Bene…ts are estimated using the model. Costs estimates are derived using two sources of information. First, the cost associated with purchased services are provided in the DARS data. Second, information on administrative costs and the costs of services provided internally or as similar bene…ts (i.e., purchased or provided by another governmental agency or not-for-pro…t organization with no charge to DARS) are derived using aggregate …scal year summary reports submitted by DARS to the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA). We begin by estimating the private labor market bene…ts of VR services using the structural model estimates summarized in Section 5. Using both a 5-and 10-year post-treatment observation period for those individuals who received some service, we compute the mean present discounted value of the provided services relative to receiving no services. 24 Using a quarterly discount factor of 0:99, the estimated mean discounted bene…ts are $37236 with a standard deviation of $26317 using the 5-year window and $74250 with a standard deviation of $53024 using a 10-year window. These estimated bene…ts are notably higher than those found for VR clients with other limitations. For people with mental illnesses, for example, the estimated mean return ranged from $4200 in the short run to $8400 in the long run (Dean et al., 2016) . For people with cognitive impairments, the estimated mean bene…ts ranged from $10979 for the short run to $21175 for the long run (Dean et al., 2015) .
While these estimated bene…ts are derived directly from the structural model, there are several reasons they may not re ‡ect the true social bene…ts of VR services (Dean et al., 2015 re ‡ect the displacement of non-VR participants, particularly if VR services do not improve the VR participant skills or the job matching process. In general, however, training programs for low-skilled workers are not thought to cause notable labor market displacements (see Lalonde, 1995) . Second, VR services may lead to other social bene…ts associated with the increased attachment to the labor market and the resulting reduction in use of the social welfare system. While society does not bene…t from reduced transfer payments or increased tax revenues -taxpayer gains exactly o¤set VR participant losses (except for changes in deadweight loss) -social bene…ts may result from reduced administrative cost associated with welfare programs and increased VR participant utility due to reduced welfare dependence (Lalonde, 1995) . Finally, there is substantial heterogeneity in the discounted bene…ts across the VR participants, suggesting that there may be a great deal of variation in the overall bene…ts estimates (see Figure 7) . Next, to measure the costs of services, we combine the DARS data on purchased services with year-end expenditure information provided to the SSA. Table 15 displays the mean costs of purchased services for each service. Overall, the average purchased service cost for clients with physical disabilities is $1617 and we estimate non-purchased served costs to be $2000 to $3000 per client. 25 Thus, we estimate mean cost per client from $3600 to $4600. By comparing the mean bene…ts and costs, we see that DARS services provided to people with physical impairments have substantial positive returns. In total, mean bene…ts range from $37236 using a …ve year window to $74250 using a ten year window, while mean costs range from $3600 to $4600.
Finally, using the estimated model, we compute the rate of return for each client receiving VR services. As in Dean et al. (2016) , for each DARS client, we compare the expected ‡ow of bene…ts from the service package provided to the ‡ow of bene…ts with no services. We approximate cost as
where f is a combination of administrative costs and average (unobserved) inhouse service and similar bene…ts costs, y ij is an indicator for receipt of service j by person i (as de…ned in equation 1), and c j is the average cost associated with service j (computed as the ratio of "mean expenditure" and "% with positive expenditure" in Table 15 ). Figure 12 shows the distribution of quarterly rates of return for three scenarios: a) a 10-year horizon with f = $2000, b) a 5-year horizon with f = $2000, and c) a 10-year horizon with f = $3000. Clearly, earnings ‡ows in years 6 through 10 have a signi…cant impact on estimated rates of return.
27 ;28 Focusing on the distribution curve associated with a 10-year horizon, one sees that only 2:5% of clients with physical impairments have negative rates of return (i.e., there is no positive discount rate that will justify the cost of services relative to the ‡ow of future bene…ts). Meanwhile, when f = $2000, 90% of clients have quarterly rates of return above 9:5% quarterly (38:6% annually), and 50% have quarterly rates of return above 28:7% (174% annually); increasing f = $3000 has only minor e¤ects on the distribution.
Conclusions
We …nd that VR services for clients with physical impairments have substantial positive long-run rates of return, with a median rate of return of 174% annually. These estimated rates of return are notably larger than those found for clients with other impairments. For those with cognitive impairments, for example, Dean et al. (2015) …nd that at least 21% of clients have negative rates of return and the median annual rate of return is 19:7%. Similar results are found for clients with mental illnesses in Dean et al. (2016) . These di¤erences in rates of return seem to re ‡ect the nature of the limitations. As noted earlier, many persons with physical impairments have relatively strong ties to the labor market prior to being injured; nearly half of the VR clients with physical impairments 2 6 An alternative is to use actual cost for each individual. The attractive feature of such an approach is that there is signi…cant variation in cost even conditional on the set of services received. However, we choose to use only average costs for each service because, in the model and estimation procedure, we do not allow actual expenditures to a¤ect labor market outcomes. 2 7 At very high rates of return, later years become irrelevant because of the implied heavy discounting. For example, at a 20% quarterly rate of return, the discount factor associated with earnings 6 years in the future is 0:013. 2 8 Estimated rates for returns for non-VR government training programs aimed at economically disadvantaged people also tend to be sensitive to short versus long horizons, and vary widely across programs, demographics, and studies. In some cases, these training programs are found to have average rates of return that are negative. But, in many others, the average annual rates of return are in excess of 100% (Friedlander, 1997; and LaLonde, 1995) . are employed one year prior to applying for VR services (see Figures 3) . Apparently, in this setting, modest interventions provided by DARS can lead to relatively successful transitions back to the labor market. In contrast, persons with cognitive impairment or mental illness tend to have weaker attachments to the labor market. For example, only around 20% of clients with cognitive impairments are employed one year prior to applying for VR services (see Dean et al., 2015) . In addition to learning about the overall impact of VR services on labor market outcomes, our model disaggregates the e¤ects across six di¤erent service types. Except for maintenance, we …nd that all of the services have large, positive long-run bene…ts. Most notably, education and restoration have median bene…ts for a 10-year earnings ‡ow in excess of $50000, while the other service types -diagnosis & evaluation, other services, and training -have median longrun bene…ts in excess of $20000.
Appendix
Covariance Structure
The covariance matrix of the errors u 
where 
Counselor and Field O¢ ce E¤ects
We use as an instrument in equation (1), a transformation of the proportion of other clients of the same counselor provided service j, i.e., a counselor e¤ect. We also use a transformation of the proportion of other clients from the same o¢ ce provided service j, i.e., an o¢ ce e¤ect. We transform the counselor and o¢ ce e¤ects using an inverse normal distribution function to make it more likely that, as the counselor and o¢ ce e¤ects vary, their e¤ect on service probabilities can vary by approximately the same amount. To consider why this is attractive, consider a counselor who almost always uses a particular service. We want to allow for the possibility that this will imply that all of the clients of the counselor are very likely to receive that service. Limiting the counselor e¤ects to vary between (0; 1) makes it harder for that to occur. On the other hand, using an inverse distribution function for a distribution with the real line as support makes the range ( 1; 1). While such a transformation makes sense analytically, in practice, it might cause problems for values of the untransformed e¤ect at or near the boundaries. We propose a "…x" that both makes sense and solves the boundary problem. In particular, we propose replacing the untransformed e¤ect r ij with
where r j is the mean value of r ij across all counselors (o¢ ces), ! i = 1 i , and i is the number of clients seen by counselor i (o¢ ce i). This speci…cation allows the counselor e¤ect and o¢ ce e¤ect to be more important for those counselors (o¢ ces) who have many observed clients. In fact, it has a certain Bayesian ‡avor to it.
There are some respondents who either have missing counselor or o¢ ce information or who have a counselor (or o¢ ce) with no other clients. For such cases, we can not create our e¤ects. 29 Because of such cases, we include a set of dummies for missing counselor and/or missing o¢ ce e¤ects. It turns out that these dummies are very highly correlated, and most of the missing o¢ ce e¤ects must be excluded from the model to avoid a singular Hessian. Tables A1, A2 , and A3 provide information about the moments of the transformed counselor and o¢ ce e¤ects. One can see that there is signi…cant variation in both. There is some evidence of left-tailed skewness but no unreasonable outliers. The lack of outliers occurs despite zeroes for some services for some counselors and …eld o¢ ces because of the weighted average inherent in equation (14) . Table A3 shows that the correlations between …eld o¢ ce e¤ects and counselor e¤ects are small enough so that multicollinearity does not prevent us from getting precise estimates of each e¤ect. 3. The effects of education missing on training, education, restoration, and other services were fixed at -5 because there were no observations with education missing receiving those services.
1. Standard errors not presented to save space but are available from the 2. Single-starred items are statistically significant at the 10% level, and 
